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Abstract
We investigate the behavior of limit order books on the meso-scale motivated by order
execution scheduling algorithms. To do so we carry out empirical analysis of the order flows
from market and limit order submissions, aggregated from tick-by-tick data via volume-based
bucketing, as well as various LOB depth and shape metrics. We document a nonlinear rela-
tionship between trade imbalance and price change, which however can be converted into a
linear link by considering a weighted average of market and limit order flows. We also doc-
ument a hockey-stick dependence between trade imbalance and one-sided limit order flows,
highlighting numerous asymmetric effects between the active and passive sides of the LOB. To
address the phenomenological features of price formation, book resilience, and scarce liquidity
we apply a variety of statistical models to test for predictive power of different predictors. We
show that on the meso-scale the limit order flows (as well as the relative addition/cancellation
rates) carry the most predictive power. Another finding is that the deeper LOB shape, rather
than just the book imbalance, is more relevant on this timescale. The empirical results are
based on analysis of six large-tick assets from Nasdaq.
Keywords: limit order books, order flows, scarce liquidity, price impact
1 Introduction: the Meso-Scale
With the proliferation of the electronic trading, research on the fine time-scale of financial markets,
exemplified by the microstructure of Limit Order Books (LOBs), continues to grow in scope and
importance. The microstructure time-scale (on the order of milliseconds) works with the discrete
events that correspond to the order messages submitted to the exchanges and hence captures
the fundamental price formation and market behavior. It is often contrasted with the classical
“diffusion-limit” framework (on the order of hours and days) that works with continuous-time
processes and allows for infinitesimal trading. However, in between these two time-scales, there
lies a third: the meso-scale, capturing the asset behavior on the order of minutes.
The meso-scale is of key importance for the market participants engaged in market-making
and order execution. Consider the proverbial trader who executes a large order (an action orig-
inally driven by a macro-scale analysis) by dividing it into smaller “child” orders executed over
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multiple “slices”. She is concerned with execution costs comprised of instantaneous slippage and
longer-term price impact. The first component is addressed via the routing layer that optimizes
individual trades, for example to avoid “walking the book”. The second component is addressed
by the scheduling layer that determines the pace of execution and usually works over 2–10 minute
intervals. This scheduling revolves around the expected evolution of the LOB through time,
requiring aggregation of the information from the static LOB snapshots and lifting it to the
meso-scale.
The dynamics of the book on the meso-scale, and the associated consumption and provision of
liquidity drive the concept of resilience, also known as the transient and permanent price impacts,
that underlies much of the literature on algorithmic trading and order execution. On the tick-by-
tick scale, the effect of an order is mechanical and can be easily described using observable LOB
characteristics, namely the resting limit volume at various levels, summarized via LOB depth
and shape. In particular, for vast proportion of executions direct price impact is zero, as only a
portion of the respective top queue is consumed. However, on a longer time-scale (as implemented
in order splitting algorithms that typically unfold over several hours), the enormous volume of
the order messages obscures the link between price evolution and individual orders, and renders
static liquidity measures irrelevant. Consequently, proper calibration of the HFT models ought
to rely on meso-scopic/dynamic, rather than microscopic/static LOB metrics.
To measure liquidity on the mesoscale it is necessary to consider aggregated metrics about
types/volumes of orders submitted. A natural quantity of interest therefore becomes the order
flows which can be viewed as the dynamic version of instantaneous LOB characteristics. Statistical
analysis of the order flows is the main focus of this article. We analyze the mesoscopic links
between market and limit order flows, and between order flows, prices and static LOB metrics.
Our main goal is a phenomenological description of these relationships, so as to a provide a data-
driven perspective for LOB behavior. For empirical work we utilize a cross-section of 6 liquid,
large-tick Nasdaq tickers spread across 2 calendar years.
Based on our analysis, we report several key findings. First, we document an S-shaped non-
linear relationship between mid-price change ∆P and market order flow VM . In tandem, we
also record a strong linear relationship between ∆P and Net Liquidity flow, which is a weighted
average of VM and limit order flow V L. These empirical results offer an important correction to
the commonly assumed framework of linear price impact: to obtain linearity one must take into
account touch limit orders, weighted appropriately. Ignoring limit flow dramatically weakens the
explanatory power of the models, in fact our findings suggest that limit flows are at least, if not
more statistically significant than the market trades.
Second, we use statistical tools to identify key predictors for price formation on the meso-
scale. We find that the explanatory power of the top-level LOB queue depths is rather weak.
This is primarily due to the rapid fluctuations in those quantities, which do not allow for easy
time-aggregation. Instead, liquidity measures that look deeper into the book are more relevant
for quantifying liquidity. At the same time, we find that the LOB metrics offer an important
modulation to the effect of order flows and do add a non-negligible predictive power. Third, we
disentangle price trend (defined in terms of overall bid/ask-side pressure captured by market order
flow VM) from liquidity (primarily captured by limit order flows V L). This allows us to pinpoint
the meaning of scarce liquidity. We carry out further statistical analysis in that direction, which
is of interest for adaptive order scheduling that can respond to varying expected price impact.
The meso-scale is intrinsically defined via aggregating the raw LOB data into slices, and the
question of aggregation method looms large. The micro-scale is naturally discrete-event-based.
On the macro-scale, the high degree of averaging lends itself naturally to a (calendar) time-based
limit. Here we propose that volume-based aggregation is most appropriate for the meso-scale.
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Thus, our analysis is based on working with LOB buckets, with each bucket containing the same
amount of executed (market) volume. As we show, this yields a desired stabilizing effect on the
LOB data and removes some known artifacts. It also quantifies what we mean by the meso-scale;
informally it can be characterized as dealing with “dozens of trades”; indeed our buckets contain
10–100 market executions, accompanied by 100–1000 limit order events. At that intermediate
time-scale, the aforementioned event-based analysis is less tractable for capturing the dynamic
quantities that come to the fore; while time-based analysis must contend with huge swings in
market activity that are caused by extreme clustering of LOB events.
As far as we are aware, this is the first academic study of volume-aggregated intra-day LOB
data. Several previous studies used fixed-interval time-aggregation, such as 15-min slices in [21]
and 5-min slices in [10], [20] and [5]. The closest study to ours is by Cont et al. [12] who also
investigated the relationship between order flows, price change and book depth, and reached some
similar conclusions. However, that study was limited to working only with top-level book infor-
mation, and most crucially postulated the expected (linear) link between the different variables.
In contrast, we employ non-parametric tools to obtain data-driven findings about variable impor-
tance, empirical non-linearities, et cetera. Moreover, we also investigate the asymmetric features
of the order flows which are obscured by the total netting carried out in [12].
Our investigation offers a statistical counterpoint to the research on optimal execution which
has put forth a plethora of different theoretical price impact models. From the empirical point
of view, there is already a growing literature on tick-by-tick data, see [12, 14, 17, 16, 34, 35].
These are complemented by LOB simulators that aim to capture short-term behavior and price
impacts. The most popular framework views the LOB as a collection of interacting queues [22,
29, 28, 30]. For example, Huang et al [24] model limit order, cancellation, and market order
arrival rates as a function of the queue sizes. Unfortunately such models are much less tractable
on the meso-scale, so few analytic results are so far available. An alternative way to model
the mesoscopic price impact is to infer the impulse response function, known as the propagator,
of an individual order/trade. The aggregate effect on the mid-price is then viewed as a linear
superposition of individual impacts, see [16, 7]. However, such event-by-event analysis largely
excludes capturing the statistical effects of observable covariates which “dress” the evolution of
the respective dynamical system describing the LOB. Yet another micro-scale analysis which
also leads to important meso-scale implications is the emerging strand on long-memory effects of
micro-structural phenomena [32], as well as time-series approaches to the functional evolution of
the entire LOB shape [20].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss LOB evolution
in the context of static and dynamic measures of liquidity and price impact, as well our volume-
bucketing method. Sections 3-4 contain our main statistical analysis regarding the meaning of
price trend, liquidity, and scarce liquidity. Section 5 takes a different tack, addressing the time-
series properties of order flows. Finally, Section 6 discusses ramifications from the previous sections
and offers an outlook for further work.
2 Limit Order Books: Price Impact, Order Flows and Liquidity
2.1 Limit Order Book
Electronic trading marketplaces match liquidity providers and consumers via the limit order
book (LOB). Participants asynchronously submit trading messages which are aggregated by the
exchange into the LOB. The two base classes of trades are market orders and limit orders. Market
orders, henceforth called trades, indicate actual transactions taking place and are denoted as
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M := {(TMi , OMi )}, where TMi are the execution times, and OMi are corresponding execution
volumes. OMi ’s are signed, with positive indicating a buy order and negative a sell order. Limit
orders, henceforth orders, are L := {(TLi , OLi , SLi )} where TLi are the message time stamps, OLi are
(signed) order volumes and SLi is the limit order price. Positive values of O
L
i indicate submission
of a new limit order, while negative OLi indicates a cancellation. Limit orders reside in the LOB
until executed by an incoming market order, or being cancelled by the participant who initially
placed the order. We refer to [19, 11] for more general introduction on the functioning of LOBs,
and other types of orders possible.
At any given moment t, the LOB lists all the resting limit orders, represented as a vector
(pji (t), v
j
i (t)), listing the volume vi(t) ≥ 0 of resting limit orders at price pi(t). The superscript
j ∈ A,B denotes the Ask and Bid sides, respectively. The subscript i = 1, 2, . . . indexes the price
level which is discretized in terms of the tick size ∆p, typically 1 cent for US equities. Indexing
is done separately for each side of the LOB, starting from the best-bid and best-ask levels and
moving consecutively. Thus, pA1 (t) is the best-ask (at the touch) price, p
A
2 (t) = p
A
1 (t) + ∆p is the
second price level, etc. Some queues can be empty, vji (t) = 0. However the top queues v
j
1(t) > 0
are always strictly positive, and after netting executable limit orders, the best-ask price is at least
one tick above the best-bid pA1 (t) ≥ pB1 (t)+∆p. Based on the bid/ask prices, we have the midprice
P and the spread S:
P (t) :=
pA1 (t) + p
B
1 (t)
2
, Spr(t) := pA1 (t)− pB1 (t). (1)
2.2 Static LOB Snapshots and Price Impact
A starting point for understanding LOB liquidity is the information contained in a static snapshot
of the LOB. The most basic measure of liquidity is the spread Spr(t) which dictates the costs
of a round-trip trade that is fundamental to market-making. However, for liquid US equities the
spread may not be useful, as it is not sensitive to changing market conditions. In particular for
“large tick” assets, the bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick. This is the case for all
the assets in our sample, where Spr(t) is essentially always 1 or 2 ticks – and the 2-tick spreads
are short-lived: after opening up the spread quickly closes as an aggressive limit order is posted
inside the spread.
Another commonly used measure is the volume-at-the-touch vj1(t), i.e. queue lengths at the
best-offer and best-bid price levels. Over very short time horizons, v1 indicates the immediate
liquidity available for incoming market orders, and hence drives the direction and likelihood of a
mid-price change. Recall that P changes by a half-tick when vj1 hits zero, whereupon v
j
1 is reset
to the posted volume at the new top LOB level. A related quantity that measures the relative
“strength” of each side of the book is the Book Imbalance
BI :=
vA1 − vB1
vA1 + v
B
1
∈ (−1, 1). (2)
The book imbalance BI has been shown to be predictive of the next order side and resulting price
move [14, 12, 9]. Consequently, at the slicing/routing level of the execution process, BI is often
used as an indicator of when to employ limit orders and when to cross the spread and place a
market order [33, 28]. In a similar vein, [24, 30, 26] document a link between BI and order arrival
rates.
The top queues offer only a “tip of the iceberg” summary for the overall LOB shape. The
direct procedure to describe LOB shape employs units of shares and measures cumulative depth
4
over the first k levels
Djk :=
k∑
i=1
vji , j = A,B, k = 1, 2, . . . . (3)
Thus, Dj1 = v
j
1 is the top-level depth, D
j
2 = v
j
1 + v
j
2 is the total volume posted at the top two
levels and so on. A complementary inverse procedure measures execution cost in units of ticks.
Execution cost quantifies the slippage from immediately making a market trade, converting depth
(shares) into monetary terms. Fix a quantity N of shares and let i¯j(N) := max{k : Djk(t) < N}.
Then
PIjN (t) :=
1
N

i¯j(N)∑
i=1
vji (t)
(
pji (t)− P (t)
)
+ (N −Dj
i¯j(N)
(t))
(
pj
i¯j(N)+1
(t)− P (t)
) . (4)
Thus, PIjN blends information about the shape of the LOB by computing weighted average cost
(relative to the mid-price) per share of immediately executing N shares in the j-th direction. The
map N 7→ PIjN (t) then summarizes the shape of the book in terms of executing different order
sizes. Intuitively, PI ∝ 1/D is inversely proportional to depth.
Remark 1. We stress that PIN (t) is a theoretical construct, based on the counterfactual that
an immediate market order is placed exactly at t. In practice the vast majority of market trades
have zero impact, consuming less than the standing liquidity at the first level. Moreover, latency
delays make it difficult to realize the “observed” PI in real-life trades.
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Figure 1: Left: Stylized limit order book. In this illustration the spread is two ticks Spr(t) = 2∆p
and book imbalance is positive vA1 > v
B
1 ⇒ BI(t) > 0. Right: Measuring execution cost in a
hypothetical limit order book. The underlying queue lengths are taken to be (v1, v2, v3, v4) =
(8000, 10000, 7000, 15000). We plot n 7→ PIn (solid) and the fitted line n 7→ Sˆ · n based on the
impact slope Sˆ (dashed).
The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the above computations for a hypothetical book with
v1 = 8000, v2 = 10000, v3 = 7000, v4 = 15000. The solid curve shows N 7→ PIN . Note that
(4) implies that for N ≤ v1, PIN = Spr/2 is half the spread; for larger order sizes, PIN has a
nonlinear shape due to the N -dependent averaging weights. For example, at N = 30, 000, we
obtain PIN = 1.8 ticks, which averages the cost of 0.5 ticks for the first 8000 shares, 1.5 ticks for
the next 10K shares, 2.5 ticks for the 7K thereafter and 3.5 ticks for the last 5K shares.
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One can observe from the plot that N 7→ PIN is asymptotically linear, which would be
consistent with the book having an asymptotic “rectangular” shape with v¯ volume per level.
(Namely, v¯ ' N/(2PIN ) which for the computation above yields v¯ = 8333 taking N = 30K.)
Motivated by this idea, [10] have proposed to compute an LOB slope Sj which is obtained from
a linear regression model
PIjn = S
j · n+ , n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (5)
estimated using the standard least-squares fit. The slope coefficient Sj can be interpreted as
a linearized price impact (on the j-th side of the book) per share and allows to imply a single
liquidity metric from the collection (PIjn)n. In Figure 1 the estimated impact slope is Sˆ = 0.0611
ticks/1000 shares, see the fitted dashed line Sˆ ·n. Sˆ can be inverted to map into “averaged” book
depth v¯ = 0.5/Sˆ = 8176. An advantage of the metric S is the ability to average vk’s over multiple
levels and incorporate the spread Spr, which makes it less sensitive to short-term fluctuations
that dramatically lower the statistical usefulness of depth measures Djk.
2.3 Order Flows and LOB Evolution
To visualize the meso-scopic behavior of the book, Figure 2 shows an event-by-event summary of
an LOB for a representative 90-second period. The main plot at the bottom shows the top-level
queue lengths vj1 driven by the market orders (in orange) and limit orders at-the-touch. At the
top of Figure 2 we also track the contemporaneous effect on the mid-price, with dotted vertical
lines marking a change in bid- or ask-price.
The Figure indicates that following a market execution the LOB response varies widely, at
times bouncing back through fresh posted volume, while at other times falling through and fading.
We observe several “regimes”: episodes of strong resilience when market orders are counteracted
with added limit orders (so that vj1(t) stays roughly constant over time), and other periods where
market orders are accompanied primarily by limit order cancellations, creating a strong negative
trend in vj1(t), known as an LOB fade. This happens on the left of Figure 2, where the arriving
market flow is heavily tilted towards sell orders TI < 0 and net limit flow to the bid-side touch is
clearly negative. The result is a rapid drop in mid-price, creating scarce liquidity for sellers and
increasing their respective execution costs. A milder form of this is when few new limit orders
are added at the touch, so that the book is not replenished fast enough and “retreats” along
with executed trades. Our goal below is to find meso-scopic predictors that explain whether
market orders are likely to be met with strong resilience via new limit orders, or minimal liquidity
provision or even net cancellations.
2.4 Volume Bucketing
To move from the micro- to meso-scale we divide the trading day into buckets that are used for
aggregation. Buckets are defined in terms of their start- and end- time-stamps {τk}, with the k-th
bucket consisting of all messages entered during (τk, τk+1] (special treatment possibly accorded
to the first and last message, see below). Slice times τk+1 are taken to be the time-stamp of the
final trade included in bucket k. The resulting bucketed quantities are:
VMA,Bk :=
∑
i:τk<T
M
i ≤τk+1
|OMi |1{OMi ≷0}; (6)
V L
j,(1)
k :=
∑
i:τk<T
L
i ≤τk+1
OLi 1{SLi =pj1(TLi )}, j = A,B. (7)
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Figure 2: Best bid/ask queue levels vj1(t) for TEVA (bottom curves) along with bid/ask price p
j
1(t)
(top). Event-by-event data taken from a 90 second window beginning at 2:30pm on 2/18/2011.
Limit orders are in red (ask-side) and blue (bid), market executions in orange. All orders are plot-
ted event-by-event (in particular without re-combining split market orders), so that the mechanics
and sequence of order arrivals are more clear.
Thus, VM j are the respective aggregated volumes of executed market buys and sells, and V Lj,(1)
are the volumes of limit orders at the touch. Note that V Lj,(1) tracks the mid-price throughout
the bucket, aggregating the respective top-level (at the time of message submission) limit orders.
Because the tickers we consider are highly liquid in the sequel we focus exclusively on top-level
limit orders V L ≡ V L(1). Recall that market orders capture the consumption of liquidity by ag-
gressive orders and decrease top-level depth vj1, while limit orders can either augment v
j
1 (liquidity
provision) or decrease it (order cancellations). Consequently, VM j ≥ 0 is non-negative by con-
struction, whereas V Lj can be of either sign depending on the net limit additions/cancellations.
Given a slice (τk, τk+1) we define the corresponding price change as
∆Pk = P (τk+1)− P (τk). (8)
Based on the buckets we also define the discrete snapshots of LOB statistics through indexing by
k; for example the book imbalance BIk ≡ BI(τk) or the depth Dk ≡ D(τk). As analogue to the
static BI, we also define the normalized trade imbalance
TIk :=
VMBk − VMAk
Vk
, (9)
where Vk = VM
A
k +VM
B
k is the total executed volume in the bucket. By definition, TIk ∈ {−1, 1};
if TIk = 1 then all executed trades in the bucket were ‘Buys’, and if TIk = −1, all executed trades
were Sells. Trade imbalance captures the aggregate supply and demand for the asset and is often
used as the basis for measuring price impact [6, 10].
We propose to bucket in terms of executed market volume, namely keeping Vk ≡ V fixed across
buckets. Technically, this requires that market orders are sometimes split in two as one bucket
“fills” up and the next begins. In our main analysis we take V ' {0.25%, 1%, 2%} of average
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daily volume (ADV, based on the considered time period of 10:00am–3:45pm) for the respective
ticker. This means that on average there are about 400 (resp. 100, 50) buckets per day; actual
number of buckets can be 30%–500% of the average due to fluctuating levels of market activity.
Note that slicing is done in terms of executed volume; volume of limit orders V LAk + V L
B
k
remains random across buckets. The reason for this is that even though market orders account for
only 2 − 4% of total trades, they indicate actual transactions taking place and hence ultimately
drive traders’ P&L. Thus, due to their intrinsic nature of “putting money on the table”, they are
typically viewed as influential by other participants and carry the most information for defining
the “business-time” for the ticker.
Most related studies have used time-based aggregation. For instance, [12] used 10-second
slices, [5, 10, 20] used 5-min slices. Nevertheless, using volume buckets has several attractive
properties for our purposes. First, slicing by trade volume rather than time yields consistency in
information across buckets. Under clock-time bucketing, one can easily appreciate the difficulty
of comparing buckets with dramatically different activity levels (in the extreme, a time-based
bucket could be entirely empty). Second, working in volume-time also reduces the intra-day
seasonality effects, such as volume and volatility clustering, and improves statistical properties
(such as Gaussianity) of the (V Lk, V Mk) time-series. Third, comparison of limit order activity
across buckets is naturally normalized when measuring in (trade) volume time, i.e. the stable
quantity is not V Lk per se, but rather the ratio V Lk/Vk (or V Lk/VMk). For example, it is
intuitive that limit additions to the touch depend more on quantity of market trades than passing
minutes. Fourth, our method avoids the difficult challenge of estimating trade volume effects that
are present in trade-by-trade aggregation.
2.5 Datasets
For our statistical analysis we use Nasdaq ITCH TotalView data which contains “Level-2” informa-
tion on order book events. Specifically, we have access to direction and size of market executions,
as well as limit order additions, modifications and cancellations for i ≤ 30 levels (ticks) into
the current book. To avoid synchronization issues, we work only with Nasdaq-based messages,
leaving out information from other exchanges. Furthermore, since erratic LOB behavior is often
seen near the market open and close, we consider only activity between 10:00am and 3:45pm.
Other pre-processing included removing all executions against hidden orders (less than 10% of
executed volume) and aggregating executed trades. Market orders are often matched against
several smaller limit orders; we re-created the size of the original market order by aggregating
orders that were consecutive, in the same direction, and with identical time stamps.
To give a broad slice of market activity, we use a total of six different tickers, covering two
distinct time-periods. Thus, we used data on MSFT, TEVA and BBBY from the first 100 days
of 2011, and data on INTC, ORCL and NTAP from the last 100 days of 2013. All assets are
categorized as large cap stocks, with market caps ranging from about 12B USD for BBBY, and
up to 240B for MSFT. Tables 1-2 provide summary info for each stock. We note that all stocks
are highly liquid, with several thousand trades per day, and hundreds of thousands of limit
orders. Moreover, the analyzed LOBs are quite deep, with average depth of 3–10 average event
size (AES). As a result, most of the economically relevant information can be gleaned from the
top-level events. These still correspond to 50K–100K touch limit orders per day, and respective
nominal order volume
∑
k |V Lk| ' 5M–100M shares.
To illustrate how volume aggregation works, we describe it in the case of ORCL. We use
V = 20000 which is about 1% of the average daily volume of 1.84M shares traded during 10:00am–
3:45pm. In total, we obtain 9229 aggregated buckets over the 100 days of data. Since the average
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MSFT TEVA BBBY
mean (stdev) mean (stdev) mean (stdev)
Mean Price (USD) P 26.29 (1.25) 50.34 (2.73) 50.51 (3.64)
Mean Abs Price Change (ticks) 1.80 (1.46) 3.33 (3.07) 3.67 (3.27)
Ave Daily Vol (shares) VM 10.0M (4.61M) 1.21M (1.06M) 0.64M (0.30M)
Num of Daily MO’s (events) 5340 (2173) 5455 (2484) 4281 (1483)
Ave Event Size (shares) 1643 (3612) 293 (596) 192 (321)
Ave Limit volume (shares) V L 116.4M (42.6M) 12.04M (5.90M) 6.60M (2.58M)
Num of Daily LO’s (events) 292K (92K) 110K (45K) 77K (31K)
Spread (ticks) Spr 1.01 (.067) 1.13 (.362) 1.29 (.599)
Mean depth at Level 1 D1 25.5K (27.9K) 1.33K (2.62K) 0.63K (1.09K)
Mean depth at Levels 1+2 D2 59.2K (29.9K) 2.80K (7.4K) 1.24K (0.97K)
Ave Slope (ticks/000’s shares) S .0274 (.00976) 0.691 (0.305) 1.37 (0.663)
Table 1: Summary statistics (mean/standard deviation) for MSFT (Microsoft), BBBY (Bed
Bath & Beyond) and TEVA (Teva Pharmaceuticals) for the 100 trading days from 1/2/2011
to 5/25/2011. Average price change is per 1%-ADV volume buckets.
trade size for ORCL is about 800 shares, a typical slice has about 25 trades, and about 500 limit
orders. Figure 3 shows a histogram of net limit order-flow V Lk (using combined Bid and Ask
data) for ORCL. As expected, average limit flow at the touch is typically positive, i.e. there are
more orders entered than cancelled, providing liquidity against executed trades. For ORCL at
that aggregation frequency about 5.5% of the buckets had negative V Lj ; this number fluctuates
in the 2–10% range across the 6 assets. Also observe that typically the nominal limit order flow
V L is larger than executed volume V , hinting at the high rate of “churn” in the limit orders, even
after netting additions and cancellations. The middle panel of Figure 3 shows the distribution
of the ORCL bucket durations, τk+1 − τk; the median duration is about 170 seconds. Note the
strong skew with many buckets that last for 5 or even 10 minutes; the longest bucket covered
29 calendar minutes (during a particularly slow lunchtime on day 19). Notably, the correlation
between V Lk and τk+1 − τk) is statistically 0, implying minimal relationship between liquidity
provided and physical time elapsing within a volume slice. Appendix A provides a summary of
the bucketing employed for each asset.
3 Price Trend and Liquidity State
As discussed, at the meso-scale the most important quantities are the order flows, i.e. VM and
V L from (6)-(7). In this section we document their relationship to the fundamental financial
output of the LOB: the mid-price change ∆Pk.
Based on the price formation mechanism originating in the LOB, the changes in the mid-price
are driven by the respective liquidity consumption and provision. A simple narrative ties ∆Pk to
the market demand for the asset, exemplified by the trade imbalance TIk. Self-evidently, if there
are more market buys than sells, the price is expected to rise, and if TIk < 0 we expect ∆Pk < 0.
A basic model assumes a linear relationship between ∆P and TI. A theoretical justification for
this is provided in the Obizhaeva and Wang [31] framework and uses a combination of permanent
and transient price impact to link executed volume to price move. The basic premise is that limit
9
INTC ORCL NTAP
mean (stdev) mean (stdev) mean (stdev)
Mean Price (USD) P 23.66 (0.98) 33.84 (1.28) 41.26 (1.35)
Mean Abs Price Change (ticks) 1.31 (1.10) 2.11 (1.79) 2.71 (2.27)
Ave Daily Vol (shares) VM 3.58M (1.18M) 1.84M (0.80M) 0.71M (0.31M)
Num of Daily MO’s (events) 2058 (609) 2880 (1192) 2171 (935)
Ave Event Size (shares) 1740 (3819) 837 (1257) 252 (287)
Ave Limit Volume (shares) V L 99.62M (33.42M) 40.30M (15.96M) 15.80M (5.26M)
Num of Daily LO’s (events) 263K (77K) 190K (68K) 136K (46K)
Spread (ticks) Spr 1.01 (0.13) 1.03 (0.17) 1.08 (0.29)
Mean depth at Level 1 D1 13.9K (10.0K) 3.9K (2.8K) 1.24K (1.13K)
Mean depth at Levels 1+2 D2 31.9K (17.9K) 8.5K (4.8K) 2.69K (1.28K)
Ave Slope (ticks/000’s shares) S .0367 (.0158) 0.136 (.0659) 0.432 (0.201)
Table 2: Summary statistics (mean/standard deviation) for INTC (Intel), ORCL (Oracle), and
NTAP (Net Appliances) for the 100 trading days from 8/9/2013 to 12/31/2013.
orders refill the book over time, but take time to be entered. Therefore, price changes are driven
by “too many too fast” trade executions, and quantified by the LOB resilience (e.g. the rate of
the respective exponential recovery), which yields the sensitivity of ∆P to TI.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of ∆P against TI over buckets of 1% ADV
(12,000 shares) for TEVA. While a positive relationship can be seen as expected, the link is
clearly non-linear. In fact, there is an S-shape behavior, whereby for strongly one-sided markets,
TI close to ±1, the expected price change becomes constant or even declines. This puzzling result
in fact indicates intelligent order-placing: traders take into account the state of the LOB when
executing orders and hence induce dependency between order flow and price moves. In other
words, 12,000 shares executed consecutively in the same direction is an infrequent occurrence for
TEVA, and is usually precipitated by a deep/resilient book at that moment. Another important
feature of Figure 4 is the dispersion in the observed price change ∆Pk conditional on concurrent
trade imbalance TIk. For example, conditional on TIk = 0.5, we observe that ∆Pk|TIk = 0.5
ranges from −0.08 to 0.16 for buckets across our sample period, which is financially material.
This indicates that on its own trade imbalance has low predictive power, i.e. price formation is
driven by much more than the net executed volume.
To statistically capture the relationship between price change over each volume slice ∆Pk =
Pk+1 − Pk and the concurrent trade imbalance TIk we fit a nonparametric model of the form
∆P = g(TI) + , (10)
where g is the link function to be estimated and k are i.i.d. regression residuals. Specifically
to account for the observed non-linear dependence we use a generalized additive model (GAM),
taking g(·) in (10) to be a penalized regression spline that is fit via cross-validation. The analysis
is done using the R package mgcv [36] and is carried out for each stock on volume buckets from the
entire sample period, excluding the rare buckets where a single large market order filled the entire
bucket (leading to a bucket with zero duration). An example of the resulting fit TI 7→ g(TI) is
shown in the left panel of Figure 4 illustrating the aforementioned S-shape.
Figure 5 shows a cross-section of fitted GAM models (10) across assets (left panel) and bucket
sizes V (right panel). We find that the S-shape observed in Figure 4 is highly persistent, so
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Figure 3: Left: Volume-normalized limit order flow at the touch V Lk/V (net of additions and
cancellations). About 5.5% of buckets had negative V L indicated in red. Middle: Time elapsed
during volume buckets ∆τk; the mean duration is indicated by the dashed line. Right: one-sided
depth Dj1 at the touch (combined Bid/Ask information). Figures drawn for ORCL over 100
trading days with buckets of V = 20K traded volume (a total of 9229 buckets).
that it is a fundamental stylized feature of the liquid, large-tick LOBs under consideration. In
order to compare the fitted g’s, we normalize the y-axis measuring price changes by the respective
mean absolute price move. This yields a consistent way of mapping trade imbalance, which is by
definition in the range of {−1, 1} to the relative price move ∆Pk/Ave(|∆Pk|).
The above findings are in contrast to the widely used linear price impact framework that can
be traced back to [31] and has since appeared in numerous optimal execution/market-making
models, e.g. [1, 18, 2]. Part of the discrepancy can be attributed to our volume-based bucketing
which through normalizing TI to be in [−1, 1] crystalizes the underlying nonlinearity. From
a different direction, our finding is consistent with the documented volume-concave impact of
individual market trades which implies a concave relationship between |TI| and ∆P [16].
Remark 2. One approach to improve the goodness-of-fit of (10) is to fit a separate regression
model for each trading day. Indeed, it is often assumed that the LOB behavior is driven by a
daily cycle. We found that while daily models do reveal significant day-to-day variation in the
shape of the best fit curve (cf. [10]), the resulting R2 is only marginally better compared to fitting
a single model over all days. For example, the R2 based on individual day fits for MSFT 1% ADV
improves from 46.9% in Table 3 to 53.3%. So the significant noise in (10) is not simply the result
of inter-day variation, but rather shows that liquidity provision is stochastic on an intra-day basis.
Furthermore, checking the residuals ̂k’s from (10) fitted to the whole sample period, we find that
they are reasonably Gaussian and exhibit minimal temporal autocorrelation.
3.1 Limit Flow
Fundamentally, price is driven by the net liquidity supply; looking just at traded volume as was
done in (10) only considers liquidity consumption. Thus, a natural next step is to look at both
market orders that consume liquidity, and limit orders that provide liquidity. For the latter, we
concentrate on orders added/cancelled at the present bid/ask touch which are by far the most
relevant given the liquid LOBs under consideration. To capture this idea, we fit the linear model
∆P = α0 + α1TI + α2(V L
B − V LA) + , (11)
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Figure 4: Left : Price change ∆Pk plotted against trade imbalance TIk for TEVA for the first 100
days of 2013 (9954 buckets with V = 12000). The fitted curve is based on (10). Right: Price
change against net liquidity provision for NTAP over buckets of V = 8000. We plot the linear fit
from (11) (light line) and the non-parametric GAM model g(·) based on ∆P = g(NetLiq) + ,
with NetLiq from (12) (dark curve). Since ∆Pk ∈ {0.005k : k ∈ Z}, the y-axes are discretized by
half-ticks.
Only TI (10) Net Liquidity (12)
Ticker 0.25%ADV 1%ADV 2%ADV 0.25%ADV 1%ADV 2%ADV
BBBY 0.290 0.270 0.243 0.493 0.596 0.590
INTC 0.303 0.403 0.421 0.371 0.682 0.767
MSFT 0.370 0.469 0.485 0.579 0.785 0.765
NTAP 0.293 0.315 0.302 0.470 0.712 0.751
ORCL 0.320 0.314 0.276 0.449 0.708 0.750
TEVA 0.269 0.276 0.269 0.520 0.607 0.592
Table 3: R2 scores from the nonparametric fit against TI in (10) compared to R2 scores from a
linear fit against TI and V L in (11).
which connects price change to net executed volume and net limit order flow. The main finding
is that (11) yields an excellent fit. Moreover, the linearity in (11) is intrinsic, i.e. taking into
account the limit flows V L completely removes the previously documented S-shape. Let us define
NetLiq := TI + β · V L, (12)
where β = α2/α1 is the ratio between the impact of a market order vis-a-vis that of a touch
limit order. The right panel of Figure reffig:SvsTI shows (for a different ticker, to showcase
the generality of the phenomenon) that NetLiq captures the fundamental price formation story
of liquidity provision, yielding ∆P ∝ ∆NetLiq (the estimated intercept coefficient α0 in (11) is
statistically indistinguishable from zero). In the Figure we also compare the linear and GAM-
based fits of ∆P against NetLiq which are found to be nearly identical, confirming the linearity
postulated in (11)).
Incorporating order flows not only removes the nonlinear price response, but also dramatically
improves the goodness-of-fit, see Figure 4 again. Table 3 compares the R2 scores from (10) and
12
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Figure 5: Relationship between normalized price change ∆Pk/Ave(|∆Pk|) and bucket trade im-
balance TIk. Left: six tickers across the two sample periods; Right: for ORCL across 10 different
bucket sizes V .
(11). We observe a major improvement from about R2 ' 0.4 when using only TI as a predictor
for ∆P , to R2 ' 0.7 when using both TI and V Lj . This suggests that the predictive power of
V Lj is at least as significant as of the executed volume. Table 3 also shows that goodness-of-fit
improves as we consider larger bucket sizes, implying that the other predictors get averaged out
over time (i.e. are primarily about the microstructural effects of the LOB).
While mechanically net liquidity is simply VMA−VMB+V LB−V LA, it is commonly assumed
that the price impact of limit orders should be less than that of market orders. This is precisely the
reason for using separate coefficients α1, α2 in (11). The resulting ratio β that is used to construct
NetLiq in (12) is another fundamental stylized feature of the meso-scale. Table 4 reports the
estimated βˆ := α̂2/α̂1 across assets and bucket sizes, which can be observed to be highly stable
across all cases. As expected, the respective price impacts are highly non-equal, namely the
relative effect of a limit order is only about 50%–70% of a market order. Again, we observe that
β is larger for larger V ’s: on the macro-scale price formation is mechanically determined by total
liquidity supplied/consumed; on the meso-scale there are further effects coming from LOB shape
and shorter-term patterns.
Remark 3. We also tested for the relative price impact of limit order additions and cancellations
by further decomposing into V Lj = V Lj,+ − V Lj,−. Statistically, the price impact of the two
latter order types was the same, giving minimal improvement to the fit in (11). However, as we
will show below, cancellations are important for capturing periods of scarce liquidity.
The idea of (12) echoes the analysis in Cont et al. [13], who however worked with time-
based buckets (of 10 seconds, so generally shorter than ours) and combined all flows into a single
predictor, i.e. pre-assigned equal price impact α2 = α1 or β = 1 to market and limit orders.
Our analysis suggests that β is significantly less than 100%, which seems to be closer to market
practice. On the one hand, intuition suggest that executed trades carry more information, i.e. are
more relevant for questions of adverse selection or informed trading and hence contribute more
to price formation. On the other hand, the nominal volume of limit orders V L is 1–3 times
larger than nominal volume of VM ; without separate coefficients, ∆P would be unduly affected
by limit orders. The above findings are also consistent with the event-by-event analysis done in
[16, 22] who found that the impact of market trades (measured by the temporal impulse response
13
Ticker 0.25%ADV 1%ADV 2%ADV
BBBY 0.39 0.55 0.58
INTC 0.20 0.42 0.55
MSFT 0.41 0.67 0.59
NTAP 0.33 0.64 0.68
ORCL 0.24 0.57 0.68
TEVA 0.49 0.66 0.66
Table 4: Price impact β of touch Limit Orders relative to Market Orders based on (12).
function) for large-tick Nasdaq stocks is 2–4 times larger than that of limit orders.
Remark 4. We also mention the less-known work of [23] who proposed a different way of defining
Net Liquidity by using power-weighing, namely considering
∑
i:τk<T
L
i ≤τk+1(O
L
i )
α1{SLi =pj1(TLi )} in
(7), with the power coefficient α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, he advocated looking at square-root-
volume (α = 0.5) or just order counts (α = 0) when constructing the NetLiq measure. On the
latter point, [5] used the number of market trades to estimate permanent price impact.
3.2 Limit Flows vs Market Flows
The previous subsection documented that price change is driven by a weighted average of VM and
V L, with the link being essentially linear. This motivates the analysis of the relationship between
trade imbalance and limit order flows, shown for a representative ticker in Figure 6 below. We
separately plot V LA and V LB against TI to highlight the inherent nonlinear dependence between
the two sides of the book. Indeed, when the market is unbalanced (large |TI|), the book behaves
asymmetrically: the net limit order activity is stable on the passive side, while liquidity provision
on the active side declines. We conjecture that this effect is due to market-makers competing to
avoid adverse selection, leading to diminished new limit orders and existing order cancellations.
Thus, Figure 6 shows that there is a hockey-stick-response curve V Lj = gj(TI) on each side of
the book. For example, looking at V LA, there is a “base-line” level of liquidity provision that
takes place as long as TI < 0.3 or so (i.e. less than 2/3 of execution are buys). However, when
the market is dominated by Buys, V LA tends to be lower, i.e. the Ask side is replenished less
than usual under upside price pressure. For some stocks (BBBY, TEVA see Figure 9 in Appendix
B) we see an upside-down V-shape, whereby V LA also falls for TI close to −1, i.e. the Ask
side “hibernates” under intense sell pressure. Mirror effects take place on the Bid side. These
findings suggest that LOB resilience (and hence price impact) is essentially driven by one-sided
flows rather than aggregate two-sided metrics. For example, when net limit order flow at the best
bid V LB is large, the price is unlikely to move lower even if trade imbalance is negative.
Figure 6 also shows that large upside price moves tend to coincide with (i) positive TI; (ii)
smaller than usual V LA and (iii) larger than usual V LB; the converse holding for downside
price moves. Hence when prices move rapidly, both the market and limit order flows are highly
unbalanced, lending credence to weak resilience manifesting itself as a “wrong-way” correlation
between VM and V L. Given the very large number of heterogeneous players participating in
trading activity, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the respective causality. Whether
HFT market-makers are predicting one-sided market flow or reacting to it, liquidity provision via
V L seems to reflect liquidity consumption in VM .
Remark 5. An extreme example of weak resilience was documented in [25] in the context of the
market events of July 12, 2012. On that day four large-cap US stocks exhibited an unusual trading
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of the net limit order flow at the best bid V LBk (left) and best ask V L
A
k
(right) against the trade imbalance TIk across the 8886 buckets of V = 8000 for NTAP. The
y-axis is normalized via V Lj/V . Red (blue) points indicate volume buckets with price decrease
(increase) ∆Pk of more than 0.07. The solid lines indicate the average response g
j(TI) obtained
from a spline-based GAM fit to V Lj = gj(TI) + .
pattern: heavy buying following by heavy selling in a predictable fashion over 30 minute intervals.
The result was a sawtooth pattern in the asset prices, apparently generated by significant price
slippage for the aggressive buyers/sellers. Lehalle et al. [25] conclude that this weak LOB resilience
was driven by liquidity providers who anticipated one-sided market order flow and were jockeying
for queue priority via rapid cancellation of their resting top-level orders after each execution.
4 Liquidity Predictors
The results in the previous section strongly indicate that including concurrent limit order flow
V Lk along with trade imbalance TIk dramatically improves the goodness-of-fit for predicting ∆Pk.
Nevertheless, for purposes of optimal execution the role of trade imbalance remains paramount.
Indeed, the execution algorithm displaces some of the market orders, so that the order scheduler
in effect partially controls the trade imbalance TIk+1 in the upcoming bucket. Hence, forecasting
the conditional price change ∆Pk+1|TIk+1 is crucial in scheduling the next slice.
Unlike the time slicing approach, each bucket in our setup contains an identical amount of
traded volume. Thus the difference between observed price change ∆P for two buckets with
similar trade imbalance TI must be due to differences in LOB resilience and/or shape. Therefore,
the findings in the previous section lead to the natural decomposition of price formation into
two components: (1) price trend, which is primarily about the supply and demand for the asset
captured in trade imbalance TIk, and (2) liquidity, which is seen in the deviation of the observed
∆Pk from the best fit curve between the two variables, and has been already shown to strongly
depend on V Ljk. In this section we seek to more systematically identify the key variables important
for explaining LOB liquidity on the meso-scale. This is done by constructing a series of regression
models taking in a variety of potential covariates, and quantifying their significance and effect.
The following Section 4.1 then concentrates on predicting the periods of scarce liquidity that lead
to out-sized price impact.
For the above purpose, we utilized four classes of statistical models: (i) classical linear models
(LM) using stepwise selection criteria; (ii) LASSO models fit via cross-validation; (iii) MARS
15
models; (iv) random forests (RF). Generically, we model
∆P =
∑
r
φr(X) + , (13)
where X is the vector of all the covariates and the basis functions φr are adaptively picked by
the model. We focus our attention on the primary effect of various predictors and therefore take
φr to be low-dimensional in X: they are linear for LM and LASSO, of the hockey-stick form
(X(r) −Kr)+ for MARS, and indicator functions of hypercubes for RF. Thus, except for RF no
interactions among covariates are a priori considered.
The three model frameworks beyond LM offer complementary perspectives on variable im-
portance and ultimately model selection. LASSO uses L1-regularization to drop less relevant
predictors giving a crisp quantification of variable importance and easily interpretable coefficients
for covariate impact. Multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) aims to identify nonlinear
relationships through using piecewise linear hinge basis functions. It can also search for statisti-
cally significant predictors from low-degree interactions among covariates. Finally, RF constructs
a black-box nonlinear model by randomly considering subsets of predictors to obtain a piecewise
constant relationship. Random Forests yield only indirect measures of variable importance or
contribution via model averaging, but makes minimal parametric assumptions about the func-
tional form of covariate impact. Note that our goal is not to maximize predictive performance,
but to obtain interpretable qualitative analysis. Hence, we do not explore fully non-parametric
“machine learning” tools.
To build a statistical description for ∆P we utilized both static measures based on the LOB
state at bucket times τk, as well as dynamic quantities measured over time. The static predictors
tested in our regression models included the measures of LOB depth and shape described in
Section 2, specifically price impact PIN , impact slope S, cumulative depth Di for i = 1, 2 and
book imbalance BI. For completeness, we also included time-of-day τk. All static quantities
were measured at the start of the volume slice i.e. the price change Pk − Pk−1 from the activity
during [τk−1, τk] was regressed against static variables measured at time τk−1. Dynamic quantities
included the contemporaneous net limit flows V LAk , V L
B
k , as well as lagged quantities: trailing
limit flow V Ljk−`, lagged price change ∆Pk−`, and lagged trade imbalance TIk−` over the previous
` volume buckets, where ` ∈ 1, 5, 10, 20. Also included was the exponentially weighted moving
average of recent trade imbalance, first introduced in [4],
TIMA
(β)
i+1 := e
−β|OMi |TIMA(β)i + (1− e−β|O
M
i |) sign(OMi ), (14)
where i indexes arrival of market orders of size |OMi | and β dictates the exponential weights; we
set β = 0.5/V .
Important Covariates. Our results indicate that the trade imbalance TI and the limit
order flows V Lj are by far the most statistically significant predictors for ∆P . Further predictors
that were consistently picked by the models include the price impact PIj , the depth at the top-2
levels D2, and the proportion of limit order cancellations PC
j := V Lj,−/V Lj . For the latter,
we observe that when cancellations at the bid dominate additions, PCB > 0.5, the price can
move lower on very little volume. Weaker predictors (picked by some models but not all) are
Book Imbalance BI and Impact Slope S. There are additional covariates that were statistically
significant for one or two of the tickers, but these yield negligible improvement to overall model
fit. See Table 6 in Appendix B for a summary of variable importance.
The RF models also assigned strong statistical significance to the interactions TI×PI, V Lj×
PIj (one-sided interaction between limit flow and book impact) and TI × S. Since both PI
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and S are in units of ticks/share, the latter two terms are denominated in ticks, and provide an
impact-normalized measure of market trend. Indeed, the static LOB metrics capture the shape
of the book and hence modulate the effect of the major predictors in the flows. The relevance of
the above cross-terms was confirmed by a LASSO model where we manually added all possible
interactions between TI, V LA, V LB and the impact covariates PI and S. As an additional check,
no further interactions (considered by building a degree-2 MARS model) were deemed significant.
Overall, using the R2 as a simple goodness-of-fit metric, we find that it starts out at R2 ' 30%
when regressing ∆P against just TI; rises to about R2 ' 70% once V LA, V LB are included; and
reaches about R2 ' 80% after adding in the mentioned LOB shape metrics. Another 1-2% gain
in R2 is possible by including all the covariates listed, including their lagged versions.
Of note, top level depth D1 was statistically insignificant in the regression tests. Given the
amount of activity in each volume bucket it is not surprising that “shallow” LOB measures
capturing only the top of the LOB are not all that useful. Instead, the models identify (partly
due to the underlying collinearities) a mix of the deeper LOB shape metrics, including the top-2
levels volume D2, the price impact PIN (which looks at 3-5 levels deep, N ' Ave(D4)), and the
impact slope S (a cost-averaged depth over ' 4 levels). We note that for more liquid tickers (such
as MSFT), D2 is more relevant, while for less liquid ones the models emphasize PI. Another
interesting find was the (moderate) significance of trailing moving average of executions TIMA
from (14), with a consistently negative relationship to ∆Pk. The inclusion of TIMA appears to
be capturing the tendency of stock prices to, more often than not, retrace recent movement. More
precisely, when TI leans with the prevailing trend (TIMA) the impact on price is less.
Returning to a more qualitative description, Figure 8 (Appendix C) shows paired scatterplots
across 9229 buckets of ORCL for limit flows V Lj , proportion of cancellations PCj and impact
slopes Sj . Some important observations are:
• Strong negative correlation ρ ' −0.4 between V LA and V LB, meaning that Ask/Bid limit order
activity is complementary: at any given moment most of the limit orders go to one side;
• Positive correlation (ρ ' 0.45) between order flow V L and proportion of cancellations PC on
the other side: as more orders are added, say, on the Ask side, limit orders are also cancelled
on the Bid side;
• Negative correlation between depth D and order flow V L on the opposite side, so that the
less-active side of the book also tends to be more shallow;
• Positive correlation between book depth on the two sides, DA and DB, meaning that the book
as a whole fluctuates between being deep and shallow;
• Weak positive correlation (ρ ' 0.2) between cancellation proportions PCA, PCB on the two
sides, dovetailing with the previous point.
These complex cross-relationships imply that disentangling the marginal effect of a given predictor
is difficult, and a simple additive model, such as MARS or LASSO, should be interpreted with care.
For instance, the ask-side depth metric DA2 is intrinsically correlated with D
B
2 , V L
B, SA, PCA
and so on. Therefore, the counterfactual of changing ask-side depth while keeping all other
covariates fixed, captured by a regression coefficient (or partial dependence plot) of DA2 , is not
too meaningful.
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4.1 Scarce Liquidity
Intuitively, scarce liquidity describes the situation where large price moves occur under low volume,
indicating weak resilience. Within our framework, the latter corresponds to an “abnormally”
large ∆Pk relative to the contemporaneous trade imbalance TI. Pinpointing the confluence of
factors that coincide with scarce liquidity is of practical importance due to the potentially large
ramifications of executing during a period of low resilience in the LOB.
To capture the idea of a “disproportionately large” price move relative to executed volume we
remove the effect of trade imbalance to focus on the resulting residuals ̂k = ∆Pk − g(TIk) from
(10). Namely, we define a scarce liquidity indicator variable SLjk ∈ {0, 1} in a binary fashion in
terms of ̂k, so that SL
j occurs on at most one side of the LOB per volume bucket:
SLAk := I{̂k ≥ M¯}, SLBk := I{̂k ≤ −M¯}, (15)
where we empirically choose the scarcity threshold M¯ in terms of the standard deviation of the
residuals ˆ, specifically M¯ = 1.5StDev(̂1:K). Thus, scarce liquidity occurs on each side of the
LOB in approximately 6% of volume buckets. Our data-driven definition of liquidity is similar to
Amihud [3]. The pairs plot in Figure 8 in the Appendix color-codes buckets with scarce liquidity,
highlighting the relationship of key predictors to SLj .
To quantitatively analyze the occurrence of scarce liquidity we ran a logistic regression model
for SLA and SLB with the covariates described in the previous section. Compared to the re-
gression models for ∆P of the previous section, logistic regression is geared towards capturing
one-sided LOB effects and also focuses attention on the buckets with more extreme price moves.
It can therefore better identify the LOB regimes that cause substantial price moves, compared
to (13) that concentrates on fitting the “typical” price formation factors. Recall that logistic
regression assumes that SLjk ∼ Bernoulli(pijk), where the log-odds of pijk are specified via
logitpij =
∑
r
φSL,jr (X). (16)
This analysis reveals that occurrences of scarce liquidity are driven by a high asymmetry in
the limit flows, as well as reduced LOB depth and/or high cancellation rates. For example, the
major predictors of SLA are V LB (+ve correlation), TI (-), V LA (-) and DA,B2 (both -). Several
of these influences need to come together to explain SLA. Financially, we observe that scarce
liquidity tends to occur on a passive and shallow side of the book. For instance, if the Bid side is
passive (high V LA and low V LB), and moreover is less deep than normal (low DB1 ), then prices
are likely to fall through on the downside, triggering SLB = 1. The logistic regression models also
show that the proportion of limit order cancellations has a high predictive power, so that large
price moves are associated with a “LOB fade”. As in the previous section, the limit order flows
were the most statistically significant predictors for SLj via (16). Unlike the previous section,
price impact PI had a heightened significance. Specifically, same-side price impact (PIjN when
testing pij) was of approximately equal importance as V Lj for all six tickers. The physical timing
τk, was also significant, as was bucket duration ∆τk. The fitted models imply that scarce liquidity
is more likely in the morning, or when trading is slow (large ∆τk).
Table 7 in Appendix B reports goodness-of-fit of the above logistic models using a hold-out
test set. The Table shows the relative frequency of SLj against the predicted log-odds pij . We
observe that for vast majority of cases the log-odds are low and in those buckets there is indeed
almost no cases of abnormally large price moves. On the other hand, when the model predicts
scarce liquidity, it is correct in about 70–80% of the time. We note that due to the low frequency
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of SL, the model predicts less than half of all scarce liquidity occurrences, i.e. there are more false
negatives than true positives.
Table 6 in Appendix B lists the significant predictors for the three regressions we ran (for ∆P ,
SLA, and SLB). In the Table we used the importance function in the randomForest package
[27] to roughly classify given predictors into Most Important (**), Somewhat Important (*) and
Unimportant (-). Since the RF model is data-driven and able to capture nonlinear effects the
resulting variable importance is more robust compared to other model classes we tried, such as
Lasso or MARS which only capture low-degree interactions and have trouble with collinearity.
We also manually checked the predictors selected by LASSO and MARS vis-a-vis those of RF to
confirm covariate importance.
Table 6 matches the intuition that same-side covariates (especially the impact-dollar metrics
PIj and Sj) ought to be more significant for explaining SLj . We also note that the logistic
models are more complex (assigning predictive power to more covariates), and moreover include
additional “two-sided” predictors, such as bucket duration or price volatility, that would not con-
tribute to ∆P , but make sense for forecasting large price moves. The observed asymmetric effects
imply the need to build separate models for different aspects of the limit-flow/price relationship.
The listed significant predictors are remarkably consistent across assets. Moreover, they are com-
plementary/symmmetric on the Ask and Bid side (the respective regressions were run completely
independently), indicating that these are generic stylized facts for liquid, large-tick LOBs.
5 Time Series Perspective
Previous sections carried out a statistical investigation of LOB behavior using the regression
paradigm that treats observations as i.i.d. samples from the “true population”. Of course, in
practice LOB data is sequentially ordered, so time series methods are also appropriate. However,
the observed complexity (such as multiple nonlinear relationships) makes constructing multivari-
ate time-series models a major challenge and beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes
we therefore simply present some stylized observations.
A basic test is for the presence of auto-correlation which would imply that there are some
persistent factors in the observations, and hence serial dependence among buckets that are close
in time. We first consider the net order flow variables: TI, V LA, V LB. We find that there
is minimal autocorrelation at the shorter scales (0.25% ADV buckets), but some persistence is
observed on the longer scales and for less-liquid assets. Positive autocorrelation suggests that
periods of strong liquidity provision are followed by more of the same, and conversely, low V L
tends to persist for multiple buckets. For the deeper LOB’s, we believe the persistence is still
there but a better tool than the ACF diagnostic is needed. Remarkably, the persistence carries
through for long lags, indicating presence of long-term memory on the order of hours. Figure 7
illustrates the non-zero autocorrelation in V Lj for NTAP and TEVA across 2% ADV buckets.
These results echo previous literature (e.g. [35]) that documents long-term persistence in order
flows, possibly even on the scale of days. Overall, we note that the computed auto-correlation
levels are not too strong (relative to say the very high R2 reported previously), indicating that
standard ARIMA models might not fit well.
Turning attention to scarce liquidity, as remarked there is essentially no auto-correlation in
the residuals of (10) and hence minimal ACF levels in the one-sided SLj indicators. In other
words, the ACF test does not detect any obvious clustering in one-sided scarce liquidity. At the
same time, we do find cross-correlation, so that an abnormally large positive price move is likely
to be followed by an abnormally large negative ∆Pk. This hints at the “whiplash” property of the
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LOB, where reversions in price change or in TI seem to trigger reduced liquidity provision. The
right panel of Figure 7 shows the ACF plot for the combined indicator SL = SLA+SLB (volume
buckets with scarce liquidity in either direction), which is positively auto-correlated, i.e. exhibits
some temporal clustering.
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Figure 7: Marginal autocorrelation functions (ACF) for order flows and scarce liquidity. Left:
the marginal ACF for the trade imbalance TI, as well as one-sided net limit flows at the touch
V LA and V LB. Data is based on 2% ADV bucketing for NTAP and TEVA. Right: marginal
ACF for the scarce liquidity indicator SL = SLA + SLB. In both panels dashed lines indicate
the significance threshold for the presence of autocorrelation.
5.1 Co-Movement of Ask/Bid Order Flows
Recall Figure 6 which presented an aggregated relationship between VM and V L. To capture the
respective co-movement of flows, we consider the correlation ρj between one-sided limit flows V Lj
and VM j , j = A,B. Lower levels of ρj are indicative of increased cancellations and hence less
liquidity, while positive values are characteristic of strong resilience. Negative correlation suggests
that liquidity gets removed/added in tandem with market orders, which would be characteristic
of book “fading”, cf. the event-by-event plot in Figure 2. Rapidly declining ρj could then be an
indication of the cumulative effect of persistent and aggressive buying/selling that leads market
makers to adjust their reference prices to account for added inventory risk.
A major challenge is to operationalize ρj given the asynchronous nature of the entered orders.
Using the aggregated bucketed quantities V Lk, V Mk is not convenient given the relatively large
buckets we consider—to compute statistical correlation one needs time-series of at least a few
dozen terms, while the episodes observed in Figure 2 are much more fleeting. One attempt we
made was to define the correlation on either side of the LOB as
ρjt := corr(VM
j
[t−s,t], V L
j
[t−s,t]), (17)
computing empirical correlation over a sliding window of s physical time using smaller time-based
buckets. Specifically we tried s = 1.5 hours with time buckets of 30 seconds. However the resulting
(ρjt ) were not very stable in time and the statistical significance of the resulting predictor was too
low to be included in any of the models of Section 4. Another challenge is normalizing ρ across
assets. For tickers with deeper queues, such as MSFT, the short-term behavior of limit flows is
less tied to price formation, so that V Lj and VM j are less coupled, leading to lower respective
correlations |ρj |.
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Remark 6. A related mechanism to quantify the co-movement of market and limit orders for
the purposes of explaining book liquidity are so-called toxicity indicators. Toxicity is linked to
adverse selection: in a toxic environment market-makers withdraw due to orders coming from
“informed” traders who possess better knowledge of the future asset price. In that direction, we
may mention the VPIN metric [15] which can be operationalized as the average of the absolute
trade imbalance across the ` most recent volume buckets,
|TI|k−`:k := 1
`
∑`
i=1
|TIk−i|, (18)
Large values of |TI|k−`:k, are supposed to lead to less liquidity and more volatility. Another
toxicity measure described in [8] is constructed from the event-based correlation between market
flow and price change based on the previous 200 market order arrivals:
ρTox(τk) := corr(∆Pi−200:i, OMi−200:i). (19)
We also tried to include these in our regressions, but preliminary results suggested that they
had weak predictive power (this is consistent with the feature that all lagged variables were poor
predictors relative to contemporaneous covariates). It remains an open question how to construct
a relevant volume-bucketed toxicity measure.
6 Conclusion
In this article we have investigated the meso-scopic phenomenology of price formation and liquidity
provision/consumption. The documented stylized facts are crucial for algorithmic scheduling of
child trades, where the LOB state is used as a dynamic input rather than a static parameter. Our
central take-away is that at the minute-scale the distinct order flows, both of market and limit
type, are the primary predictors of price moves. We have also observed that top-level depth and
the associated book imbalance are insufficient for forecasting price impact; rather deeper book
characteristics, such as PI and S, are better suited.
Our results pave the way for further research directions. First, we stress that it is imperative
to develop models for limit flows in parallel with the market flow. This is a challenging task
as one must consider the book asymmetry (interaction between market and limit orders on the
same side of the book), cross-effects (interactions between market buys and sells, and between
limit orders on the two sides, e.g. via book imbalance) and interaction between limit Additions
and Cancellations. Second, our approach offers a way to disentangle price evolution into price
trend (impact of market executions), book resilience(impact of limit flows) and liquidity (residual
effects that drive price fluctuations beyond their expected level). This gives a starting point for
quantifying LOB dynamics, for example to obtain a dynamic definition of liquidity regimes. In
analogue to the developed models for individual order arrivals, we need probabilistic description
for the evolution of, say, (PIk) or SLk. Third, the unique meso-scopic phenomena raise new
questions on connecting the event-based market microstructure, the time-based macro-diffusion
and the volume-based bucketing proposed herein in a single multi-scale framework.
First-generation models for execution, liquidation and market-making have been prescriptive
in nature, postulating some features of the limit order books and optimizing participant behavior
under those assumptions. The phenomenological investigation herein takes the opposite view, at-
tempting to crystalize the data-driven features. For the practical application, the next step would
be to develop predictive models that can statistically forecast book characteristics going forward,
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and therefore inform execution algorithms. Theoretically, we need models that move away from
working with static book snapshots (e.g. an abstract “depth” parameter) and towards using more
robust definitions of impact. More sophisticated frameworks for capturing the interaction between
market makers and observed flows, the so-called “toxicity” effects, are also warranted.
By design, our analysis has been limited to the most liquid, large-tick equities. While these
cover many of the most active tickers, including many blue-chip companies such as Dow Jones
components, more work is needed on other ticker types. This would include liquid small-tick
assets, such as AAPL or GOOG, which might be very active, but where the spread has non-
trivial dynamics and book depth has to be understood differently. One challenge for such tickers
is that a nontrivial portion of the limit orders are aggressive, i.e. placed inside the spread, which
requires to adjust the meaning of V L. Another issue is that when share prices are very high,
the discrete nature of order volumes becomes prominent. A different direction for future work
is analysis of large-tick but illiquid assets, where the event-by-event scale might still be relevant
even on the minutes-scale.
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Appendices
A Volume Bucketing Parameters
0.25%ADV 1%ADV 2%ADV
Ticker V med(∆τ) Trades V med(∆τ) Trades V med(∆τ) Trades
BBBY 1.5K 32.9 7.8 6K 161 31.2 12K 334 62.5
INTC 9K 21.4 5.2 36K 149 20.7 72K 324 41.4
MSFT 25K 28.0 14.6 100K 159 58.2 200K 341 116.5
NTAP 2K 36.6 7.9 8K 188 31.7 16K 393 63.5
ORCL 5K 31.6 6.0 20K 170 23.9 40K 357 47.8
TEVA 3K 31.1 10.2 12K 158 40.9 24K 337 81.9
Table 5: Summary statistics for the volume-based bucketing. We list the size V of each bucket
(in 000’s executed shares), median duration med(τk+1 − τk) in seconds, and average number of
market trades per slice.
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B Predictor Importance
Price Change ∆P Ask Scarce Liquidity SLA Bid Scarce Liquidity SLB
Predictor BBBY INTC MSFT ORCL NTAP TEVA BBBY INTC MSFT ORCL NTAP TEVA BBBY INTC MSFT ORCL NTAP TEVA
TIk ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
TIk−3:k−1 − − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗
TIk−1 − − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −
V Lak ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
V Lbk ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
V Lak−1 − − − − − − ∗ − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗
V Lbk−1 − − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ − − ∗ − −
PCak ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
PCbk ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
PIak ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗
PIbk ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Sak ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗
Sbk ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Da1 − − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Db1 − − − − ∗ − ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Da2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
Db2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
BIk−3:k − − − − ∗ − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗
τk ∗ − − ∗ ∗ − ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
τk − τk−1 − − − − − − ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Pk − Pk−20 − − − − − − ∗ − ∗ − ∗ − − − − − ∗ −
Table 6: Significant predictors for price change ∆P and scarce liquidity SLj using a Random Forest model.
We use a RF with 500 trees, and the mean decrease in accuracy variable importance metric reported in
randomForest::importance function. Highly significant (**) predictors are those with relative importance above
0.4; significant (*) predictors have relative importance in [0.15, 0.4]; the rest are labeled as not significant (-). Re-
sults are based on 1% ADV bucketing. Predictors with subscripts other than k are (averaged) lagged values over the
indicated previous buckets.
PLOT OMITTED FROM ARXIV DUE TO SIZE
Figure 8: Pairs plot for main predictors of scarce liquidity. Blue points indicate buckets with
Ask-side scarce liquidity SLA = 1, and green are buckets with SLB = 1. Plot for NTAP and
V = 8000 (1% ADV). Lower-triangle entries indicate the correlation between the predictor pairs
over the entire sample period.
SLA SLB
Low Med High Low Med High
BBBY
AUC = 0.938 AUC = 0.942
NoSL 84.73 10.71 0.40 84.28 10.59 0.37
SL 0.77 2.76 0.63 0.68 3.02 1.05
INTC
AUC = 0.928 AUC = 0.925
NoSL 86.67 7.98 0.24 86.55 8.61 0.55
SL 1.34 3.04 0.73 0.97 2.47 0.85
MSFT
AUC = 0.946 AUC = 0.963
NoSL 86.62 8.33 0.24 87.96 7.47 0.18
SL 0.77 2.36 1.68 0.49 2.70 1.19
NTAP
AUC = 0.958 AUC = 0.961
NoSL 86.11 8.74 0.34 86.62 8.12 0.31
SL 0.72 2.97 1.13 0.51 3.11 1.33
ORCL
AUC = 0.959 AUC = 0.967
NoSL 86.51 8.54 0.33 87.62 7.72 0.26
SL 0.56 2.69 1.38 0.43 3.02 0.95
TEVA
AUC = 0.934 AUC = 0.945
NoSL 85.95 9.45 0.24 86.67 8.37 0.27
SL 0.93 2.67 0.75 0.78 2.85 1.05
Table 7: Goodness-of-fit for predicting Scarce Liquidity. We list observed percentages of scarce
liquidity SL (rows) grouped by predicted model response (columns). Specifically, let pijk be the
predicted probability of SLjk as obtained from individual tree votes in a RF logistic regression
model (16) with 500 trees. Then Low = {k : pik ≤ 0.1}, Med = {pi ∈ (0.1, 0.5)}, High = {pi ≥
0.5}. AUC is the area under the receiver operator curve, computed using a hold-out test set: 2/3
of data was randomly selected for training and the rest for above testing. As a result, the actual
frequency of SLj in the test sets varies across assets in the range 4%–5%. All results are based
on 1% ADV buckets.
C Relationship between Market and Limit Order Flows
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Figure 9: Net limit order flow at the best bid (left panels) and best ask (right panels) plotted against the market order
imbalance TI. The y-axis is normalized via V Lj/V . Blue (red) points indicate buckets with large price moves: ∆Pk
of more (less) than ±1.645 · StDev(∆P ). The solid line shows the GAM fit for gj(TI) = E[V Lj |TI], cf. Figure 6.
